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CHAPTER 5 
Corporations 
DONALD J. EVANS 
§5.1. Sale of stock of corporation: Financial statements and accel-
eration clauses in agreement. Mergers and sales of businesses are oc-
curring with increasing frequency. Grozier v. Post Publishing CO.,1 
involving the purchase by John Fox of the stock of the Boston Post 
newspaper, illustrates the importance of points routinely provided for 
in the purchase agreement. 
When things did not go as expected, among the clauses in the 
purchase agreement which came under close scrutiny were those 
relating to: (1) the financial statements on which the deal was based 
having been "prepared in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles consistently followed," and (2) acceleration of the 
unpaid balance of the purchase price upon failure to make an instal-
ment payment when due. 
Balance sheet warranty. Mr. Fox argued that there was a breach of 
warranty because the reserves for contingent liability for severance 
pay set forth on the balance sheet warranted by the executors were 
substantially inadequate. These reserves were apparently adequate 
for the Post as a going concern but grossly inadequate if the Post had 
been liquidated on the date of the balance sheet. The Supreme 
Judicial Court reasoned that, since Mr. Fox bought the Post as a 
"going concern" and the agreement required the balance sheet be 
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
consistently followed, this called for a balance sheet reflecting liabilities 
on a going-concern basis in accordance with the Post's usual accounting 
methods, if those were consistent with generaJly accepted accounting 
principles. Accordingly, the Court found no breach of warranty. 
Acceleration of balance owing. One of the provisions in the agree-
ment purported to call for automatic acceleration of the balance 
of the purchase price upon a default in the payment of an instalment. 
An instalment was not paid when due. Apparently, the executors 
neither made any demand for payment nor any explicit election to 
accelerate the maturity of the unpaid balance. Mr. Fox argued that 
interest should not be allowed upon the unpaid balance of the 
DONALD J. EVANS is a member of the firm of Goodwin, Procter &: Hoar, Boston. 
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§5.I. 1342 Mass. 97,172 N.E.2d 266 (1961). 
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purchase price from the date when the instalment payment was due 
but not made. 
This presented, apparently for the first time before the Supreme 
Judicial Court, the question whether such a provision for acceleration 
required a demand or other election by the creditor to put acceleration 
into effect.2 The Court recognized that another section of the agree-
ment, by contrast, provided that in the event of a default by Mr. Fox 
the executors might instruct the escrow agent to sell stock deposited as 
collateral, and also that there is a substantial body of decisions sup-
porting the view that the courts should not write a new contract for 
the parties and should enforce the provisions strictly. The Court 
reasoned3 that in most cases, however, more equitable results would 
obtain if such a clause is interpreted as not being self-operating but as 
conferring an option upon the creditor. Otherwise, the debtor could 
confer upon himself a right of prepayment in cases in which he had 
none or could cause the running of the statute of limitations without, 
in many cases, the creditor realizing that any leniency he extends to 
the debtor might have such unintended consequences. The Court 
noted, however, that an acceleration clause might be phrased so 
specifically that it should be construed literally. Applying the general 
rule to the Post case, the Court held that Mr. Fox did not have to pay 
interest on the unpaid balance from the date the instalment was due 
but not paid. 
§5.2. Authority of officer to employ broker to sell business. An-
other aspect of a sale of a business was litigated in Bloomberg v. 
Greylock Broadcasting CO.l In this case, the question of the authority 
of an officer or agent to bind the corporation arose in the context of 
whether Mr. Podolsky, the president and also assistant treasurer, a 
director, manager of the business, and the largest though not the 
majority stockholder could employ a broker to sell a substantial part 
of the business. 
In its discussion of the point, the Supreme Judicial Court observed 
that Mr. Podolsky did not have authority, solely by virtue of these 
positions, or any of them, to sell the business or a substantial part of 
its assets, or to employ a broker to assist in effecting such a sale.2 
2 An acceleration clause advancing the maturity of the principal at the option of 
the holder upon failure of the obligor to meet his instalment obligation has been 
held to be legally binding. Cassiani v. Bellino, 338 Mass. 765, 157 N.E.2d 409, 1959 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §6.7 (1959); A-Z Servicenter, Inc. v. Segall, 334 Mass. 672, 138 
N.E.2d 266, 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§4.l0, 18.2, 20.2 (1956); Charlestown Five 
Cents Savings Bank v. Zeff, 275 Mass. 409, 176 N.E. 191 (1931). The question as to 
whether the principal is due without a demand for payment of the accelerated 
amount was considered in Cassiani v. Bellino; the Court, stating it was one of first 
impression, rendered no opinion, thus leaving the question unanswered. 
3 The Court found very persuasive the case of Peter Fuller Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Manchester Savings Bank, 102 N.H. 117, 152 A.2d 179 (1959). 
§5.2. 1342 Mass. 542, 174 N.E.2d 438 (1961). 
2 Kagan v. Levenson, 334 Mass. 100, 134 N.E.2d 415 (1956) (it is not within the 
implied powers of an officer of a corporation to execute and deliver a mortgage of 
a substantial portion of its property); Kelly v. Citizens Finance Co. of Lowell, 306 
2
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Rather, either Mr. Podolsky's authority to make such a brokerage 
contract must rest upon express, direct delegation of such authority,3 
or at least the directors, or a majority of them, must have had knowl-
edge of Mr. Podolsky's actions and approved or ratified them.4 The 
approval or ratification could be inferred from the directors' having 
knowledge of the arrangements and doing nothing to repudiate, and 
could be by informal action without the minutes of the directors' 
meetings containing any mention thereof.1I 
The opinion does not discuss to what extent, if any, a corporation 
would be liable for a broker's commission in a reasonable amount 
merely because the corporation sold its assets by reason of the services 
of the broker, irrespective of director knowledge or approval of the 
arrangement with the broker.6 Nor does the opinion circumscribe 
the extent to which a majority of the directors by informal action can 
authorize the sale, or at least the brokerage arrangement for the sale, 
of a substantial part of the corporation's assets.7 The requirements 
in G.L., c. 156, §42, for at least a two-thirds stockholders' vote for a sale 
by a corporation of all of its property and assets, including its good 
will, might well cut across any such attempt by a majority of the 
directors. Perhaps the Court had in mind merely that if a sale of all 
or substantially all of the assets of a corporation was authorized by the 
stockholders, the corporation could not be relieved of liability for a 
Mass. 531, 28 N.E.2d 1005 (1940) (president and treasurer, merely as holders of such 
offices, have little or no inherent power to bind corporation outside of a compara-
tively narrow circle of functions especially pertaining to such offices); Stoneman v. 
Fox Film Corp., 295 Mass. 419, 4 N.E.2d 63 (1936) (president and general manager, 
without more, are restricted to doing those things which are usual and necessary in 
the ordinary course of corporate business, and have no greater authority by virtue 
of being an owner of a majority of the stock); Horowitz v. State Street Trust Co., 
283 Mass. 53, 186 N.E. 74 (1933) (a person by virtue of his office either as president 
or as general manager of a corporation has no authority to sell mills); Horowitz v. 
S. Slater & Sons, Inc., 265 Mass. 143, 164 N.E. 72 (1928) (president or general manager 
has no power to arrange for the sale of a corporation without authority, expressly 
or impliedly, conferred by the board of directors). 
8 Although the Court did not specify who could so delegate, the implication would 
seem to be that such delegation would be by the directors of the corporation. 
4 Connelly v. S. Slater & Sons, Inc., 265 Mass. 155, 164 N.E. 77 (1928) (denying relief 
to a broker who allegedly arranged the sale of certain mills on the ground that 
there was no showing of a ratification by the board of directors). See also Kelly v. 
Citizens Finance Co. of Lowell, 306 Mass. 531, 28 N.E.2d 1005 (1940). 
II Kagan v. Levenson, 334 Mass. 100, 134 N.E.2d 415 (1956) (execution of mortgage 
by president and treasurer with knowledge and concurrence of directors, or with 
their subsequent and long-continued acquiescence, may properly be regarded as act 
of the corporation, even without vote of the company); Banca Italiana Di Sconto v. 
Columbia Counter Co., 252 Mass. 552, 148 N.E. 105 (1925) (unnecessary that ratifica-
tion of president's and assistant treasurer's execution and delivery of note should be 
by formal vote if corporation knew of such act and assented thereto). 
6 In Connelly v. S. Slater & Sons, Inc., 265 Mass. 155, 164 N.E. 77 (1928), evidence 
tending to show that the services of the broker were an efficient cause of the sale 
was excluded on the ground that there was nothing in the by-laws to show that the 
officers had any authority on behalf of the corporation to employ the broker. 
7 George H. Gilbert Manufacturing Co. v. Goldfine, 317 Mass. 681, 59 N.E.2d 461 
(1945). 
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broker's commission on the sale if a majority of the directors by in-
formal action approved or ratified the arrangement with the broker. 
§5.3. Application of "resulting trust" doctrine to dispute on stock 
ownership between principal stockholders. Hanrihan v. Hanrihan,1 
involving a dispute between brothers regarding ownership of common 
stock of the Albany Carpet Cleaning Company, presents an interesting 
application of the "resulting trust" doctrine in the corporate field. 
By the intestate deaths of their father and mother, six children 
inherited the ownership of the carpet cleaning business. Preferred 
stock was issued to four of the children, the other two sons, who 
operated the business, receiving common stock. Differences between 
the two brothers as to who should have control of the corporation 
were settled in 1924 by an understanding that the older brother, John, 
was to have 52i percent and his brother, Edmund, 47i percent of 
the common stock. The shares representing the additional 5 percent 
held by John were to be voted by the board of directors, and when 
back pay owing to John had been made up, the 5 percent was to be 
equally divided between John and Edmund. In 1927, the back 
compensation due John was paid. John and Edmund continued to 
run the business on an equal basis, with respect to both authority and 
salary. In 1949, John refused to turn over to Edmund the shares 
representing one half of the 5 percent.2 Attempts to negotiate the 
differences failed, and Edmund commenced suit in 1951. 
The Supreme Judicial Court concluded from the facts that the trans-
action was in the nature of a "resulting trust," in that shares represent-
ing one half of the 5 percent interest were, in essence, held by John for 
the ultimate benefit of Edmund and therefore were impressed with a 
trust in favor of Edmund. Once so concluding, the otherwise difficult 
obstacles presented by the statute of limitations, laches, and the statute 
of frauds were relatively easily resolved in favor of the "beneficiary." 
The statute of limitations does not start to run on "resulting trusts" 
until a repudiation by the trustee. The beneficiary is not guilty of 
laches if he acts with reasonable promptness thereafter. The interven-
ing two years between the repudiation and the commencement of suit in 
this case were involved in negotiations to attempt to settle the differ-
ences. The statute of frauds requiring a writing has no application 
to "resulting trusts." Hence many things are possible if the Court 
can be persuaded that the facts of the situation warrant the application 
of the "resulting trust" doctrine.s 
§5.3. 1342 Mass. 559,174 N.E.2d 449 (1961). 
2 Apparently this was the first time that Edmund had requested such shares, and 
hence the first refusal by John to assign them to Edmund. 
S In Brady v. Brady, 238 Mass. 302, 130 N.E. 677 (1921), after their mother's death, 
two brothers, each owning a four-ninths interest in her realty, borrowed money 
on the security of the realty with which to settle the estate and purchase the interest 
of an absentee brother, it being understood that the brother who received the money 
should account to the other for any portion of the loan not expended and convey 
to him a one-half interest in the realty. A resulting trust arose in favor of the 
4
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§5.4. Use of confidential information by former employee. It is 
well recognized that one cannot use trade secrets of a former employer 
without his consent.1 It is equally well settled that, at least where 
there is no express contract,2 the former employee may use his general 
skill or knowledge in competition with his former employer.3 But 
questions exist when there is no written employment contract and the 
employee uses in competition against his former employer confidential 
information not involving new or secret inventions or processes or 
knowledge of special circumstances. This issue arose in New England 
Overall Co. v. Woltmann.4 
From the facts in the Woltmann case, use of such confidential in-
formation by former employees was in blatant disregard of their under-
standing with New England Overall. Since its organization in 1903, 
New England Overall had always safeguarded with the utmost secrecy 
all information concerning its internal business, especially the names, 
addresses, requirements, and credit standing of its customers, the iden-
tity of and dealings with its suppliers, its costs, and the styles for the 
approaching season. Furthermore, it was apparently CIa general custom 
in the industry that salesmen were not to reveal or use information 
acquired during their employment to the detriment of their em-
ployers." Ii 
While still in the employ of New England Overall, the defendant 
Woltmann (sales manager) and the defendant Richman (salesman for 
the New York state territory) engaged in extensive double-dealings to 
the detriment of New England Overall. The sales manager bought in 
his own name from suppliers of New England Overall merchandise 
that was of the same design as that planned by New England Overall 
for the following year, with the object of selling it to New England 
Overall's customers before it had disclosed the spring and summer line 
to its own salesmen. Subsequently, the defendants and one N ahaas 
organized a corporation to compete with New England Overall. The 
other brother who, in substance, paid one half the oConsideration for the deeds, 
against the brother who received the realty and money. 
In Magee v. Magee,233 Mass. 341, 123 N.E. 673 (1919), a resulting trust was held 
created for a plaintiff furnishing part of the consideration for a conveyance to his 
brother and another. 
§5.4. 1 Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946); Wireless Specialty 
Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307 (1921). 
2 Such as there are in cases involving a sale of a business where the seller agrees 
not to compete. Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N.E. 856 (1935) 
(agreement made by seller of ice business which is designed to prevent seller from 
competing in that business with buyer is valid); Boston Be Suburban Laundry Co. 
v. O'Reilly, 253 Mass. 94, 148 N.E. 373 (1925) (limitation in contract of driver not 
to solicit laundry work or interfere with employer's customers in named cities held 
valid). 
3Di Angeles v. Scavzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 191 N.E. 426 (1934); Padover v. Axelson, 
268 Mass. 148, 167 N.E. 301 (1929). 
41961 Mass. Adv. Sh. lIU, 176 N.E.2d 193, also noted in §4.3 supra. 
Ii 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1115, 176 N.E.2d at 196. 
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defendants personally ordered merchandise for their new corporation 
from New England Overall's suppliers for shipment to their new corpo-
ration. In the following month, the defendants for the first time in-
formed New England Overall that they planned to go into business 
together. Thereafter, New England Overall discovered many other 
instances of double-dealing, such as the defendants having taken con-
fidential items and listings relating to customers and suppliers and 
using them to solicit both customers and suppliers of New England 
Overall. The defendants had obtained from the suppliers merchandise 
of a manufacture, style, and pattern that could not be distinguished 
from that sold by New England Overall without careful examination, 
and were selling it at cut prices that tended to destroy New England 
Overall's trade reputation and good will established over many years. 
The defendants contended that the granting of injunctive relief to 
protect New England Overall's confidential information in the absence 
of an express contract between them and New England Overall should 
be limited to situations involving new and secret inventions and 
processes or knowledge of special circumstances. 
In rejecting this argument, the Court distinguished Woolley's 
Laundry, Inc. v. Silva,6 on the ground that the list of customers in the 
circumstances of the Woolley's Laundry case was not confidential. Out 
of the employer-employee relationship, certain obligations arise, in-
cluding the obligation not to use in competition with the employer 
confidential information such as customer lists, etc., of the employer.7 
On the public interest aspects, the Court felt that the public policy 
against unreasonably restraining freedom of employment and the 
growth of monopolistic business would not be adversely affected by 
granting injunctive relief to New England Overall in this case.s 
Although not expressly set forth in the opinion, the implication 
seems clear that an important element in determining whether the 
former employee may use information obtained from his employment 
with his former employer depends upon whether the former employer 
had treated such information as confidential even though not involving 
special knowledge or new or secret inventions or processes. 
§5.5. Business organization: Business trust or partnership. Massa-
chusetts business trusts for many years have been used as a vehicle for 
conducting business enterprises.1 Interest in these trusts was consid-
6304 Mass. 383, 23 N.E.2d 899 (1939), in which names of customers of the laundry 
business committed to employees' memory were considered not confidential. How-
ever, in Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. I, 116 N.E. 951 (1917), the Court enjoined 
interference with a manufacturer's right to his own trade secret, namely, a method 
of manufacturing petticoats. 
7 Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946); 2 Restatement of Agency, 
Second, §398. 
SNew England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N.E.2d 997 (1940); 
Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 160 N.E. 804 (1928); Sherman v. 
Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 135 N .E. 568 (1922). 
§5.5. 1 In Massachusetts, the business trust was developed mainly for the purpose 
of holding, handling, and dealing in real estate. 
6
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erably heightened by the enactment in early 1961 of a federal law 
giving special tax advantages to real estate investment trusts.2 In gen-
eral terms, to receive favorable treatment there must, among other 
things, be an unincorporated association or trust, managed by trustees, 
with transferable shares or certificates of beneficial interest. 
Since such trusts are not created pursuant to any statute, as are corpo-
rations,a it is necessary to turn initially to case law for possible answers 
to many fundamental questions. Will, for example, the organization 
created by the trust instrument be treated as a separate legal entity with 
limited liability for the shareholders, or instead be treated as a partner-
ship, with the "shareholders" being personally responsible for all obli-
gations, as in the case of partners? 4 
This question arose in Ryder's CaselS in the context of whether the 
claimant was an employee of a business trust and hence entitled to 
workmen's compensation, or a partner and hence not recognized as an 
"employee" within the meaning of the workmen's compensation stat-
ute.6 In the Supreme Judicial Court's view, a declaration of trust of 
the type under consideration created a partnership (at least for pur-
poses of whether the claimant was an "employee" under the workmen's 
compensation statute) because of the power of the beneficiaries to take 
charge of the affairs of the organization at any time.7 The claimant, 
his son, and the son's wife were the sole beneficiaries, with the claimant 
and his son the trustees. The beneficiaries could apparently "alter, 
change or amend the terms and conditions" of the trust at any time.8 
Prior to the creation of the putative trust, the claimant had been em-
ployed as a carpenter by his son. After the organization of the trust, 
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §857, added by Pub. L. 86·779, 74 Stat. 1006 (1961). 
a Trustees of an association not owning or controlling a public utility are merely 
required to file a copy of the written instrument or declaration of trust creating the 
trust with the Commissioner and with the clerk of every city or town where such 
association carries on its business. G.L., c. 182, §2. The extent of regulation of a 
business trust contrasts sharply with the detailed regulation of a corporation. Id., 
c.156. 
4 A limited partner, however, will not become liable as a general partner unless, 
in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes 
part in the control of the business. G.L., c. 109, §l. See Plasteel Products Corp. v. 
Eisenberg, 170 F. Supp. 100 (D. Mass. 1959), aU'd, 271 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1959). 
II 541 Mass. 661,171 N.E.2d 475 (1961), also noted in §17.5 infra. 
6" 'Employee,' every person in the service of another under any contract of 
hire ... " G.L., c. 152, §1(4). 
7 In Flint v. Codman, 247 Mass. 465, 142 N.E. 265 (1924), in a declaration creating 
a real estate trust, the holders of a majority of the entire number of shares were 
given power to alter or amend the agreement as they deemed fit. The Court held 
that the arrangement constituted by the declaration was a partnership among the 
shareholders. In Frost v. Thompson, 219 Mass. 360, 160 N.E. 1009 (1914), the declara-
tion of trust and by-laws provided that the shareholders should have power to re-
move aU of the trustees at any time without cause, to fill any vacancies, to terminate 
the trust, and other similar broad powers. The voluntary association was held to 
be a partnership and not a trust. 
8341 Mass. 661, 664, 171 N.E.2d 475, 476 (1961). 
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the claimant continued to work in the same capacity, for which he was 
paid a weekly wage of $50, taking orders from his son and not partici-
pating in the management of the business. 
The fact that appeared to be determinative with the Court was that 
the claimant as both a trustee and a beneficiary had the same sort of 
power he would have in an ordinary partnership. The claimant had 
all of the powers of management that his son had, although in fact he 
worked under the direction of his son. The Court noted9 but did not 
comment on the fact that the trust was not one with transferable shares 
subject to G.L., c. 182.10 
Unless the theory of this case is limited to questions under the work-
men's compensation statutep the implications of the case cast doubt 
upon many business trusts conducted as closely held businesses. In a 
closely held corporation, as is well known, often the officers, directors, 
and stockholders are the sole parties in interest. Yet a person with such 
an interest would presumably not be ineligible under the workmen's 
compensation statute merely for that reason.12 Why a business trust 
should be treated differently is not considered in the Ryder's Case 
opinion. 
§5.6. Charitable corporation: Immunity not lost by incidental ac-
tivities. As is generally known, particularly in the Boston area, the 
Boston Symphony Orchestra is a very active organization. Among its 
activities are the summer music programs at Tanglewood, which in-
cludes the Berkshire Music Center, a school for music students. 
As musical director for the Voice of America, the plaintiff in Boxer 
v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc.1 wished to broadcast and record 
student programs at the Music Center. During the course of this work, 
the plaintiff was injured. 
In reaffirming the judicial doctrine of immunity of a public charity 
from liability for acts of its representatives,2 the Court took occasion to 
note that, whatever the earlier status of music in the United States 
might have been, the musical activities of the Boston Symphony are 
charitable. For purposes of this case, the Court considered it unim-
portant whether certain things done by the Boston Symphony, such as 
occasional broadcasting with a commercial sponsor and the making of 
records producing substantial royalties, may be outside the charitable 
9341 Mass. at 662,171 N.E.2d at 475. 
10 See note 3 supra. 
11 There does not appear to be any substantive reason for making such a dis-
tinction. 
12 Emery's Case, 271 Mass. 46, 170 N .E. 839 (1930). 
§5.6. 1342 Mass. 537,174 N.E.2d 363 (1961). 
2 The Court, quoting language in Simpson v. Truesdale Hospital, Inc., 338 Mass. 
787,787-788, 154 N.E.2d 357, 358 (1958), stated: "While as an original proposition the 
doctrine might not commend itself to us today, it has been firmly imbedded in our 
law _ .. and we think that its 'terminatiQn shou.1d be at legislative rather than 
at judicial hands: " 
8
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exemption.S The activities of the Berkshire Music Center, in the 
course of which the plaintiff was injured, are primarily educational. 
§5.7. Derivative stockholders' suit: Counsel fees. Not of least in-
terest in derivative suits are the fees to be awarded to counsel for the 
minority stockholders bringing the action. One of the questions that 
may arise on the matter of these fees concerns service. by counsel prior 
to his commencement of suit upon behalf of the minority stockholders. 
Another question is whether the fee should be based upon what the 
minority stockholder receives or upon the full amount of the corporate 
recovery. These points, together with the question of when the fee is 
to be paid when the recovery is to be paid in instalments, were included 
in the discussion of counsel fees in In re Pomerantz.1 The principle 
applied on the issue of counsel services before the commencement of 
the suit was whether the actions of counsel were the efficient cause of 
ante litem benefits to the stockholders of the corporation. 
In the Pomerantz case, the federal district court also noted that 
among the factors to be considered in the award of counsel fees in such 
cases is the full amount of the corporate recovery (and not merely the 
benefits flowing only to the petitioning minority stockholders) and the 
contingent nature of the recovery. In this case, in which the recovery 
was to be paid to the corporation in instalments, the payment of fees 
to the plaintiff's attorney were to be a proportionate part of each instal-
ment payment. 
§5.8. Private antitrust suit: Service of process on foreign corpora-
tion's independent contractor. Generally, service of process upon a 
party whose relationship is that of an independent contractor of the 
defendant would be considered improper.1 However, the Massachu-
setts Federal District Court in Kenmore-Louis Theater, Inc. v. Sack,2 
in keeping with the increasing liberality of the courts in such jurisdic-
tional cases,s found that the independent contractor was acting as an 
agent for the defendant, at least to the extent that the agent was solicit-
s In Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284 Mass. 300, 187 N .E. 557 (1933), it was held 
that a charitable corporation is liable for negligence in the course of activities in-
cidental to corporate power but primarily commercial in character, although carried 
on to obtain revenue to be used for charitable purposes. See also Holder v. Massa-
chusetts Horticultural Society, 211 Mass. 370, 97 N.E. 630 (1912). 
§5.7. 1186 F. Supp. 412 (D. Mass. 1960), involving part of the litigation having 
to do with minority stockholder· suits against Bernard Goldfine regarding the East 
Boston Company. 
§5.8. 1 Venus Wheat Wafers, Inc. v. Venus Foods, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mass. 
1959). 
2192 F. Supp. 711 (D. Mass. 1961). 
s Radio Shack Corp. v. Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 182 F. Supp. 717, 1960 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.3 (D. Mass. 1960). There the court held that a foreign 
corporation soliciting business in Massachusetts through an agency of a wholly-owned 
Massachusetts corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of Massachusetts. In Jet 
Manufacturing Co. v. Sanford Ink Co., 330 Mass. 173, 112 N.E.2d 252 (1953), the 
Court held a foreign corporation, although having no usual place of business, office, 
property, telephone, or listing in Massachusetts, but employing a permanent sales 
representative residing in the state, subject to jurisdiction of a Massachusetts court. 
9
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ing orders for the distribution of a motion picture that apparently was 
a subject matter - in part, at least - of the private antitrust suit. 
Hence the court concluded the defendant was doing business in Mas-
sachusetts sufficient to make the service of process proper. 
Although not discussed in the opinion, it is difficult to see how the 
activities of the independent contractor in this case, engaged in solicit-
ing for producers rentals of motion pictures, are in essence different 
from any independent contractor, such as a manufacturer's representa-
tive, engaged in sales efforts regarding products of companies whom he 
represents. The state and federal courts in Massachusetts, following 
the theory of Kenmore-Louis Theater and similar cases,4 may have 
jurisdiction over many non-Massachusetts concerns whose only contact 
with Massachusetts is having in Massachusetts an independent con-
tractor engaged in soliciting the sale of products of the foreign con-
cern. This should be distinguished from the independent contractor 
who buys and then sells for his own account. 
§5.9. Statutory simplification of incorporation procedure. Chapter 
97 of the Acts of 1961 streamlines incorporation procedure by eliminat-
ing the necessity for submitting to the Commissioner of Corporations 
and Taxation the record of the first meeting of incorporators, including 
the by-laws. The new statute provides, instead, for a certification in 
the Articles of Organization that the provisions of law as to the holding 
of the first meeting of the corporation, the election of officers, and the 
adoption of by-laws have been complied with, and a certification as to 
the date of the fiscal year and the annual meeting. 
In order that the fiscal year and the date of the annual meeting can 
be changed without amending the Articles of Organization, Section 2 
of Acts of 1961, c. 97, inserts a provision in Section 10 of C.L., c. 156, 
relative to such information being deemed not part of the Articles of 
Organization and being amendable merely by filing a certification re-
garding a change in such dates. 
4 Stein v. Canadian Pacific S.S., Ltd., 298 Mass. 479, 11 N.E.2d 457 (1937); William 
I. Horlick Co. v. Bogue Electric Manufacturing Co., 140 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mass. 1956). 
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